Monetary accommodation and unemployment: why central bank transparency matters

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.11.024zbMath1176.91109OpenAlexW2006762752MaRDI QIDQ1036851

Blandine Zimmer, Eleftherios Spyromitros

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2007/2007-27.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

wage settingcentral bank transparencymonetary regime

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (4)

STATIC AND DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY ⋮ Inflation uncertainty and unemployment uncertainty: why transparency about monetary policy targets matters ⋮ Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation ⋮ UNIONS, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND THE OPTIMAL MONETARY REGIME

Cites Work

• Political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance
• How much should central banks talk?: A new argument
• The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters*

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