An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2009.09.001zbMath1198.03026OpenAlexW2120577858MaRDI QIDQ1038265

Alexander Zimper

Publication date: 17 November 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

knowledgebounded rationalityepistemic logicunawarenesssemantic interpretationiterative solution concepts for strategic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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• Interactive unawareness
• Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Agreeing to disagree
• Unawareness and partitional information structures
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• Interactive unawareness revisited
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Epistemic models of shallow depths and decision making in games: Horticulture
• Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness
• Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi

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