On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2009.08.001zbMath1190.91029OpenAlexW2128797098MaRDI QIDQ1038267

Erwin Amann, Alex Possajennikov

Publication date: 17 November 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic stabilityevolutionincomplete information gamesreplicator dynamic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

A stochastic evolutionary game perspective on the stability of strategic alliances against external opportunism ⋮ Three-party stochastic evolutionary game analysis of reward and punishment mechanism for green credit ⋮ Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability ⋮ Dominance hierarchies induce a population's full cooperation ⋮ Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples

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• EVOLUTIONARY AND DYNAMIC STABILITY IN SYMMETRIC EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH TWO INDEPENDENT DECISIONS
• Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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