Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2009.06.002zbMath1190.91044OpenAlexW2015236909WikidataQ114013690 ScholiaQ114013690MaRDI QIDQ1038273

Rana Barua, Palash Sarkar, Satya R. Chakravarty

Publication date: 17 November 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationvoting gameaxiomsvoting powerBanzhaf indexColeman indices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

COMPARING POWER INDICES

Cites Work

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• Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices
• An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Collusion properties of values
• Axiomatization of a class of share functions for \(n\)-person games
• An axiomatization of the modified Banzhaf Coleman index
• A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
• An alternative characterization of the weighted Banzhaf value
• Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value
• On the meaning of Owen-Banzhaf coalitional value in voting situations
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
• Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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