Can international environmental cooperation be bought?

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2009.05.006zbMath1173.91430OpenAlexW1971618393MaRDI QIDQ1038409

Santiago J. Rubio, Cristina Fuentes-Albero

Publication date: 17 November 2009

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

transfersemissionsself-enforcing international environmental agreementslinear environmental damages

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (15)

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS UNDER INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ⋮ Global refunding and climate change ⋮ Cooperation in dynamic games with asymmetric players: the role of social preferences ⋮ Environmental agreements, research and technological spillovers ⋮ Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis ⋮ Understanding human and machine interaction from decision perspective: an empirical study based on the game of Go ⋮ Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment ⋮ Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries ⋮ Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations ⋮ Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay ⋮ Simulating the impact of heterogeneity on stability and effectiveness of international environmental agreements ⋮ Catastrophe and cooperation ⋮ The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries ⋮ Modeling and computation of transboundary pollution game based on joint implementation mechanism ⋮ International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight

Cites Work

• The gamma-core and coalition formation
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
• Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations
• Balanced environmental games

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