Fair Groves mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0297-9zbMath1176.91066OpenAlexW2061716670MaRDI QIDQ1038707

Duygu Yengin, Murat Atlamaz

Publication date: 20 November 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0297-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (13)

No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Ordinal allocation ⋮ Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity ⋮ A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good ⋮ Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms ⋮ Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Fair imposition
• Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
• Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains

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