Fair Groves mechanisms
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Publication:1038707
DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0297-9zbMath1176.91066OpenAlexW2061716670MaRDI QIDQ1038707
Publication date: 20 November 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0297-9
Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (13)
No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Ordinal allocation ⋮ Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity ⋮ A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good ⋮ Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms ⋮ Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Fair imposition
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
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