Natural implementation in public goods economies

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0384-6zbMath1190.91063OpenAlexW1978836767MaRDI QIDQ1039572

Takeshi Suzuki

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0384-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

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Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation

Cites Work

• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Toward Natural Implementation