Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.06.003zbMath1187.91069OpenAlexW1996206788MaRDI QIDQ1039720

John P. Conley, Nizar Allouch, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15829

zbMATH Keywords

corelarge gamescontinuum economiesjurisdictions\(f\)-corecore-equilibrium equivalencecrowding typesEdgeworth equivalenceequal treatment coreTiebout

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Public goods (91B18) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (3)

Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ Household formation and markets

Cites Work

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