Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.06.003zbMath1187.91069OpenAlexW1996206788MaRDI QIDQ1039720
John P. Conley, Nizar Allouch, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Publication date: 23 November 2009
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15829
corelarge gamescontinuum economiesjurisdictions\(f\)-corecore-equilibrium equivalencecrowding typesEdgeworth equivalenceequal treatment coreTiebout
Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Public goods (91B18) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
Related Items (3)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
- Proportional taxation: Nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
- Local public goods and average cost pricing
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
- Consistent voting rules for competitive local public goods economies
- Some comments on majority rule equilibria in local public good economies
- A Tiebout theorem
- Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
- The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies
- Small efficient scale as a foundation for Walrasian equilibrium
- Second best taxation as a game
- Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
- Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
- An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games
- Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting
- Valuation equilibrium with clubs
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
- The nonemptiness of the \(f\)-core of a game without side payments
- Voting with ballots and feet: Existence of equilibrium in a local public good economy
- Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core
- Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV
- Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
- The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
- A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
- Market models of local government: Exit, voting, and the land market
- Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types
- Equivalence of Games and Markets
- Taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choices
- Clubs and the Market
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
This page was built for publication: Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
