On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.09.007zbMath1195.91086OpenAlexW1535604700MaRDI QIDQ1039721

Arnold Chassagnon, Andrea Attar

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4717

zbMATH Keywords

insurancemoral hazardnon-exclusivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (4)

Designing insurance markets with moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts ⋮ Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness ⋮ Linear price equilibria in a non-exclusive insurance market ⋮ REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION

Cites Work

• Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
• A note on common agency models of moral hazard
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

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