Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.003zbMath1195.91064OpenAlexW2147256220MaRDI QIDQ1039725

Alvaro Riascos, Luciano I. de Castro

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

identificationmulti-unit auctionstruth-tellingfirst-order conditionsmonotonic best-reply

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Multi-unit auctions with private information: an indivisible unit continuous price model ⋮ On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding ⋮ Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values

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