Large economies and two-player games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.04.002zbMath1195.91095OpenAlexW2027825724MaRDI QIDQ1039729

Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcompetitive equilibriumstrong Nash equilibriumCore-Walras equivalenceAubin veto

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

Two characterizations of cost share equilibria

Cites Work

• Walrasian analysis via two-player games
• A discrete approach to continuum economies
• Blocking efficacy of small coalitions in myopic economies
• Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces
• Mathematical methods of game and economic theory
• The Equality of the Core and the Set of Equilibria in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities and a Continuum of Agents
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Unnamed Item

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