Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.013zbMath1195.91039OpenAlexW1990197298MaRDI QIDQ1039737

Jean-Charles Rochet

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.013

zbMATH Keywords

regulationadverse selectionSpence-Mirrlees condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (3)

Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses ⋮ Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions ⋮ The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing

Cites Work

• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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