A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion

DOI10.1007/S00712-008-0053-8zbMath1176.91081OpenAlexW2096246909MaRDI QIDQ1039901

Marc Escrihuela-Villar

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0053-8

zbMATH Keywords

collusionStackelberg leadershipcartel stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry

Cites Work

• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Which acceptable agreements are equilibria?
• When imperfect collution is profitable
• Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
• Stable cartels revisited
• Stable Cartels
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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