Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
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Publication:1041221
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2009.08.032zbMath1187.68091OpenAlexW1999960472MaRDI QIDQ1041221
Publication date: 1 December 2009
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.08.032
Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
Related Items (8)
A truthful constant approximation for maximizing the minimum load on related machines ⋮ Maximizing the minimum load: the cost of selfishness ⋮ Reducing price of anarchy of selfish task allocation with more selfishness ⋮ An efficient polynomial time approximation scheme for load balancing on uniformly related machines ⋮ The resource dependent assignment problem with a convex agent cost function ⋮ The cost of selfishness for maximizing the minimum load on uniformly related machines ⋮ A Unified Approach to Truthful Scheduling on Related Machines ⋮ On the sequential price of anarchy of isolation games
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