Wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers with imperfectly observable objective
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Publication:1041983
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2008.04.009zbMath1176.90331OpenAlexW2063226933MaRDI QIDQ1041983
Publication date: 7 December 2009
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.04.009
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- Evolutionary Games in Economics
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- Evolution of Preferences1
- Game Theoretic Applications in Supply Chain Management: A Review
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