Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2008.10.021zbMath1176.91054OpenAlexW2029161897MaRDI QIDQ1042133

Alessandro Avenali

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.10.021

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsauctions/biddingrevenuespayment rulesVCG rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

A Pareto optimal auction mechanism for carbon emission rights

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Pricing combinatorial auctions.
• Emerging multiple issue e-auctions
• Trading grid services - a multi-attribute combinatorial approach
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• Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
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• Combinatorial Auction Design
• Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
• A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service

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