Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
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Publication:1042318
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.12.010zbMath1176.91031OpenAlexW2062355723MaRDI QIDQ1042318
Publication date: 7 December 2009
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.12.010
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