Harmful competition in all-pay auctions

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.01.003zbMath1176.91060OpenAlexW2035841736MaRDI QIDQ1042337

Domenico Menicucci

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionall-pay auctionssecond-order stochastic dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• The all-pay auction with complete information
• On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• The Affiliation Effect in First-Price Auctions