Pure strategy equilibria in large demographic summary games

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.03.001zbMath1176.91010OpenAlexW2035656357MaRDI QIDQ1042339

V. W. Kolpin

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

summary statisticsnonatomic gamespure strategy Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (max. 100)

Endogenous convention, prejudice, and trust in demographic summary games

Cites Work

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• A unifying pair of Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence results
• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Non-cooperative games with a continuum of players whose payoffs depend on summary statistics
• Large games with transformed summary statistics
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• Integrals of set-valued functions

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