Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2009.06.001zbMath1183.91085OpenAlexW2031072476MaRDI QIDQ1042724

Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

real optionsagencyrenegotiationexecutive compensationCEO turnover

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Economics of information (91B44) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Related Items (1)

Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems

Cites Work

• Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts

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