Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
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Publication:1042725
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2009.06.003zbMath1183.91065OpenAlexW3125081836MaRDI QIDQ1042725
Publication date: 7 December 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/kG51nPmKvSJ8NaceYhVSXSYi/05-37.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
Related Items (15)
The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance ⋮ Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market ⋮ Unbeatable imitation ⋮ Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets ⋮ Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity ⋮ Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks ⋮ Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game ⋮ Experimental oligopolies modeling: a dynamic approach based on heterogeneous behaviors ⋮ Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets ⋮ When is tit-for-tat unbeatable? ⋮ Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms ⋮ Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations ⋮ Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response ⋮ Strategic effects between price-takers and non-price-takers ⋮ Beatable imitation in symmetric games with perturbed payoffs
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