On the complexity of market equilibria with maximum social welfare

DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2005.09.004zbMath1179.91143OpenAlexW1989010935MaRDI QIDQ1044745

Li-Sha Huang, Xiaotie Deng

Publication date: 18 December 2009

Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2005.09.004

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitymarket equilibriumNP-hardnessLeontief economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (2)

Recent development in computational complexity characterization of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Market equilibria with hybrid linear-Leontief utilities

Cites Work

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• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy

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