Optimal substructure of set-valued solutions of normal-form games and coordination

DOI10.1007/S11424-009-9147-9zbMath1191.91019OpenAlexW2014794113MaRDI QIDQ1044766

Norimasa Kobayashi, Kyoichi Kijima

Publication date: 15 December 2009

Published in: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-009-9147-9

zbMATH Keywords

locally dominant subspaceNash stable subspace

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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