Spatial pillage game

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.006zbMath1179.91026OpenAlexW2014843714MaRDI QIDQ1045977

Hanjoon Michael Jung

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

stable setcoalitional gamesallocation by forcefarsighted corepillage gamespatial restriction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Spatial models in sociology (91D25) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Cites Work

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• Pillage and property
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
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• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition