Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.002zbMath1179.91127OpenAlexW2047948379MaRDI QIDQ1045983

Julia Nafziger

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.002

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardlimited liabilitytiming of symmetric information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Ex-ante versus ex-post destination information model for on-demand service ride-sharing platform

Cites Work

• Comparing location experiments
• Efficient Timing of Communication in Multiperiod Agencies
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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