Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2009.07.002zbMath1195.91014OpenAlexW1975500573MaRDI QIDQ1045998

Dov Monderer, Itai Ashlagi, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2009.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

routing gamesignorancesafety-level equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (7)

Unnamed Item ⋮ r-extreme signalling for congestion control ⋮ Bayesian ignorance ⋮ Equilibria in Online Games ⋮ Informational Braess’ Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion ⋮ Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize ⋮ Social learning in nonatomic routing games

Cites Work

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• Potential games
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Robust game theory
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Non-cooperative games
• How bad is selfish routing?
• The price of selfish routing
• Competitive routing in networks with polynomial costs
• Potential games with continuous player sets

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