Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2009.07.028zbMath1177.91053OpenAlexW2009784329MaRDI QIDQ1046116

Jun Zhuang, Oguzhan Alagoz, Vicki M. Bier

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.07.028

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydynamic programmingsignaling gamemulti-period gamesecrecy and deceptiontruthful disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Dynamic programming (90C39) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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