Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.03.017zbMath1178.91068OpenAlexW2077572305MaRDI QIDQ1046201

Federico Weinschelbaum, Leandro Arozamena

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.utdt.edu/download.php?fname=_125320215484607500.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

oligopolysecond-mover advantageright of first refusalauctions with endogenous quantity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly ⋮ Cross-border merger, vertical structure, and spatial competition ⋮ Sequential spatial competition in vertically related industries with different product varieties ⋮ Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions

Cites Work

• On favoritism in auctions with entry
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• Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers