A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.004zbMath1179.91070OpenAlexW2089658958MaRDI QIDQ1046242

Levent Kutlu

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

social choice functionMaskin monotonicitysuperdictatorial domaindictatorial domain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Dictatorial domains
• Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
• Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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