Managerial overload and organization design

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.05.014zbMath1179.91118OpenAlexW2031493190MaRDI QIDQ1046249

Yossef Spiegel

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.014

zbMATH Keywords

project selectionmoral hazarddivisional structurefunctional structuremanagerial overloadmoral hazard in teams

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy

Cites Work

• Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
• Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies

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