The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.11.025zbMath1179.91031OpenAlexW2124458418MaRDI QIDQ1046252

David R. Collie, Helmuts Āzacis

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://carbsecon.com/wp/E2007_27.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collusioncartelsoptimal punishmentstrigger strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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