Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.07.009zbMath1179.91016OpenAlexW2082479967MaRDI QIDQ1046275

Hanjoon Michael Jung

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

paradoxcredibilityinformation transmissionhawk-dove gameanti-coordination game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (1)

Receiver's dilemma

Cites Work

• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• A Theory of Credibility
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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