Ignorance in a multi-agent setting

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.08.016zbMath1179.91128OpenAlexW1991992003MaRDI QIDQ1046299

Samuel C. A. Pereira

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.08.016

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionadverse selectionmechanism designmulti-agent contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Ignorance in agency problems
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• All-or-nothing information control
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• A simpler mechanism that stops agents from cheating
• Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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