Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.024zbMath1179.91061OpenAlexW3125181479MaRDI QIDQ1046336

Andrew Jennings, Rida Laraki, Michel Balinski

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.024

zbMATH Keywords

rankingincompatibilityCondorcetBordaelecting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

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• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking