The partially cursed and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.07.008zbMath1179.91141OpenAlexW2057473472MaRDI QIDQ1046343

Topi Miettinen

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.07.008

zbMATH Keywords

learningbounded rationalityanalogy expectationscurse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Related Items (1)

Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Learning to play Bayesian games.
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Cursed Equilibrium

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