Productive low morale

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.01.008zbMath1178.91090OpenAlexW2063881770MaRDI QIDQ1046355

Rui R. Zhao

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agentprivate evaluationrepeated moral hazardlow moraleself-enforcing contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting

Cites Work

• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
• The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment

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