Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.01.011zbMath1178.91041OpenAlexW3122310311MaRDI QIDQ1046356

Philipp C. Wichardt, Patrick W. Schmitz, Daniel Schunk

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.01.011

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversionultimatum gameparticipation costssunk costscognitive dissonance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees
• More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining
• Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior
• Searching for the sunk cost fallacy
• Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Reference points and negative reciprocity in simple sequential games.

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