Risky procurement with an insider bidder

DOI10.1007/S10683-009-9221-0zbMath1179.91087OpenAlexW2104598616WikidataQ59938121 ScholiaQ59938121MaRDI QIDQ1047785

Jacob K. Goeree, Roy Chen, Angelo Polydoro, Jan Boone

Publication date: 6 January 2010

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/51885/1/iewwp433.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsrisky procurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis ⋮ Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment ⋮ The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• The insider's curse
• Successful uninformed bidding
• Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
• Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis

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