Learning and sophistication in coordination games
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Publication:1047791
DOI10.1007/S10683-009-9223-YzbMath1179.91055OpenAlexW2030987135MaRDI QIDQ1047791
Antoine Terracol, Kyle Hyndman, Jonathan Vaksmann
Publication date: 6 January 2010
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9223-y
Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (6)
Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game ⋮ Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership ⋮ Compromise and coordination: an experimental study ⋮ Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players ⋮ Leading to efficient coordination: individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game
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