The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
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Publication:1047794
DOI10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9zbMath1180.91074OpenAlexW2028987454MaRDI QIDQ1047794
Publication date: 6 January 2010
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:056f6b1d-1a53-42df-924f-399b2f5f2478
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