The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
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Publication:1049232
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.005zbMath1180.91046OpenAlexW2041319059MaRDI QIDQ1049232
Publication date: 8 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.06.005
Cites Work
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