On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90078-1zbMath0512.90007OpenAlexW2016824691MaRDI QIDQ1050239

Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90078-1

zbMATH Keywords

correspondencemanipulationveto powercollective choice rulecoalitional nonmanipulabilitymisrepresentations of preferencesstrategy proof social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions ⋮ Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings

Cites Work

• Manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness

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