Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
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Publication:1050243
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90113-8zbMath0512.90017OpenAlexW2058783522MaRDI QIDQ1050243
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/480.pdf
incentive compatibilityfirst-price auctionexpected profitrisk averse buyersselling indivisible unitsunobservable tastes
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Cites Work
- Monopoly and product quality
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Sufficient Conditions in Optimal Control Theory
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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