Mollifiers for games in normal form and the Harsanyi-Selten valuation function

DOI10.1007/BF01755726zbMath0512.90097MaRDI QIDQ1050265

A. Charnes, Lawrence M. Seiford, John J. Rousseau

Publication date: 1982

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

mollifiersdisruptiongames in normal formsuperadditive constant sum characteristic functionvon Neumann-Morgenstern function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

A test of the characteristic function and the Harsanyi function in N- person normal form sidepayment games

Cites Work

• The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game
• Complements, mollifiers and the propensity to disrupt
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
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