A note on a generalization of the nucleolus to games without sidepayments

DOI10.1007/BF01774301zbMath0513.90095OpenAlexW2034807354MaRDI QIDQ1050910

J. Blot

Publication date: 1983

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01774301

zbMATH Keywords

existence resultsinterpersonal utility comparisonsbargaining solutionsexcess of a coalitionexcess share weightsgames without sidepaymentsgeneralized nucleolusnonemptiness resultsnonempty cores

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

A note on aspirations in non-transferable utility games ⋮ A prekernel characterization by means of stability properties ⋮ THE CORE COINCIDES WITH THE NUCLEOLUS ALLOCATIONS IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY WITH TAXATION

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The Bargaining Problem
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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