Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90031-8zbMath0513.90096OpenAlexW2145579803MaRDI QIDQ1050911

J. Blot

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/ca1db065-9070-4741-9bbe-0489be301d7e

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalityindependence of irrelevant alternativesindividual rationalityrisk sensitivitycontinuous bargaining solutiondictatorial solutionsHarsanyi-Selten solutionsindependence of equivalent utility representationstwo-person bargaining solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (10)

Introduction to the special issue in honor of Peter Wakker ⋮ Risk aversion for losses and the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ The Nash bargaining solution is optimal ⋮ Multiple-issue bargaining and axiomatic solutions ⋮ Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality ⋮ On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions ⋮ Continuity of bargaining solutions ⋮ On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents ⋮ Risk aversion in \(n\)-person bargaining ⋮ Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions

Cites Work

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• Continuity of bargaining solutions
• Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• The Bargaining Problem
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

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