Staying power in sequential games

DOI10.1007/BF00125673zbMath0515.90090MaRDI QIDQ1052248

Marek P. Hessel, Steven J. Brams

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

sequential gamesPareto-superior outcomerational terminationstaying power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Algorithms for hierarchical power ⋮ Far-sighted equilibria in 2\(\times 2\), non-cooperative, repeated games ⋮ Equilibria for far-sighted players ⋮ Staying power in sequential games

Cites Work

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• Equilibria for far-sighted players
• Staying power in sequential games
• The Banzhaf power index for political games
• Non-cooperative games
• Game theory and power indices
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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