Social utility functions for strategic decisions in probabilistic voting models
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Publication:1053583
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90030-6zbMath0517.90003OpenAlexW1968082321MaRDI QIDQ1053583
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90030-6
probabilistic votingdirectional Nash equilibriumsocial utility functionsstationary electoral equilibria
Related Items (2)
On the restrictiveness of monotonic scalable choice in probabilistic choice models ⋮ On the independence from irrelevant alternatives in probabilistic choice models
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