Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
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Publication:1054250
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7zbMath0518.90008OpenAlexW2006690860MaRDI QIDQ1054250
Ariel Rubinstein, Menahem E. Yaari
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7
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