Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
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Publication:1054623
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90021-2zbMath0519.90012OpenAlexW3122434845WikidataQ56564656 ScholiaQ56564656MaRDI QIDQ1054623
Geoffrey Heal, Graciela Chichilnisky
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8495/1/MPRA_paper_8495.pdf
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